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Abstract: This review surveys experience with evaluation practices in the govern-
ment of Canada since the mid-1960s, particularly with respect to spending reviews, 
concluding that there is little reason to expect any direct link from ongoing evalu-
ation practices to cabinet decisions. The renewed commitment to evidence-based 
decision-making announced by the new Liberal government is unlikely to change 
this conclusion. The introduction of deliverology as a support function centred in 
the Privy Council Office shifts attention from policy formation to implementation 
and program delivery, with important emphasis on innovation and adaptation. But 
the crucial challenge still rests in achieving greater public access to information and 
greater inclusiveness in decision processes. For academic leaders in public admin-
istration, attention now should shift from terminological and doctrinal disputes to 
anticipating the important consequences of machine learning and artificial intel-
ligence for education and future professional practice in public policy. 
Keywords: deliverology, spending reviews, public expenditure, access to informa-
tion, open governance, artificial intelligence
Résumé: Cet article fait état du rôle de l’évaluation au Gouvernement du Canada 
depuis le milieu des années 1960. En particulier, il analyse le lien entre l’évaluation 
et les exercices de révision budgétaire, concluant qu’il y a peu de raisons d’attendre 
de l’évaluation qu’elle ait une influence directe sur les décisions du Cabinet. 
L’engagement renouvelé du nouveau gouvernement libéral à ce que les décisions 
soient fondées sur les données probantes ne changera probablement pas cette con-
clusion. L’introduction de la résultologie, comme une fonction en appui au Bu-
reau du Conseil Privé, détourne l’attention de la conception des politiques vers 
l’implantation et l’exécution des programmes, en mettant l’accent sur l’innovation 
et l’adaptation. L’enjeu principal reste toutefois le même : réussir à améliorer l’accès 
public à l’information, et à être plus inclusif dans les processus décisionnels. Pour 
Corresponding author: Rod Dobell, University of Victoria, Centre for Global Studies; 
rdobell@uvic.ca
© 2018   Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation / La Revue canadienne d’évaluation de programme
32.3 (Special Issue / Numéro special), 371–393 doi: 10.3138/cjpe.43184
372  Dobell and Zussman
© 2018 CJPE 32.3, 371–393 doi: 10.3138/cjpe.43184
les leaders académiques de l'administration publique, l'attention devrait maintenant 
passer des disputes terminologiques et doctrinales à l'anticipation des conséquences impor-
tantes de l'apprentissage automatique et de l'intelligence artificielle pour l'éducation 
et la future pratique professionnelle dans la politique publique.
Mots clés: résultologie, revue des dépenses, dépenses publiques, accès à l'information, 
gouvernance ouverte, intelligence artificielle 
IntroductIon
The purpose of this article is to examine what the authors see as a distinct shift in 
context and emphasis from the early years of program evaluation, based on policy 
sciences, to current views of evidence-based decision-making, designed to serve 
governance in a postmodern, post-fact world. The paper does not purport to offer 
fresh data or original theory; its more modest goal is a brief expository survey. The 
question it confronts is therefore simply to know how we might view the evolution 
of evaluation and spending review in the government of Canada over the 50 years 
since the efforts of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to bring rational analysis into 
management in that Government.1
In 1969, driven by the “whiz kids” in the United States and the 1960s wave of 
enthusiasm for systems analysis and “modern” government, the then-new Cana-
dian government of Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau adopted the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) to guide its expenditure management 
decisions. This work was to be led by the Treasury Board  Secretariat (TBS), 
recently moved from the Department of Finance to be a separate department 
under its own minister, the president of Treasury Board. To support the intro-
duction and implementation of this new thinking, a new unit, the Planning 
Branch, was created within the secretariat. Appointed as deputy secretary to 
head this new unit was Douglas Hartle, professor of political economy and direc-
tor of the University of Toronto’s Institute for Policy Analysis, and formerly the 
director of research for the massive Royal Commission on Taxation (the Carter 
Commission).
Now, almost 50 years on, driven by new reformers in the United Kingdom 
and the recent wave of enthusiasm for results and accountability, the government 
of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau2 has adopted deliverology to ensure realization 
of the government’s promises.3 In its campaign platform and subsequent to the 
2015 election, the new government committed itself to evidence-based decision-
making both in formal cabinet-level decision processes and throughout govern-
ment operations, including program delivery.
This work was to be guided by a new cabinet committee on agenda and 
results, chaired by the prime minister, together with a new deputy ministers’ 
committee on policy innovation. To support the introduction and continuing 
implementation of this new thinking, a new unit, the Secretariat on Results 
and Delivery, was created within the Privy Council Office. Appointed as dep-
uty secretary to head this new unit was Matthew Mendelsohn, director of the 
Sunshine, Scrutiny, and Spending Review in Canada 373
CJPE 32.3, 371–393 © 2018doi: 10.3138/cjpe.43184
University of Toronto’s Mowat Centre for Policy Innovation, formerly deputy 
minister in the Ontario government and co-author of the 2015 Liberal Party 
election platform.
That platform committed the government to an expansive budgetary posture 
and substantial fiscal stimulus, leading to the prospect of large budget deficits 
sustained over several years. Budget 2017 offered no timeline for return to budget 
balance, though aiming at a declining debt/GDP ratio over the period to 2019. 
Since then, a new defence policy paper (June 6, 2017) suggests—perhaps in 
response to American pressure in NATO—very significant increases in defence 
expenditures. The budgetary cost of the government’s commitment to reconcilia-
tion with First Nations and Indigenous people has yet to be reckoned.
There appears to be no appetite at this time for a dramatic expenditure re-
duction and cost control exercise, such as the 1994 Chrétien–Martin program 
review initiative that successfully addressed the massive budget deficit left by 
the previous Mulroney–Campbell government, or even the subsequent strategic 
reviews and Deficit Reduction Action Plans (DRAP) of the Harper government. 
Nevertheless, the possible need for such an initiative has to be anticipated. In that 
case, can either program evaluation, based on systems analysis, or the machinery 
of deliverology, really help?
We accept the general conclusions in the articles by John Mayne and others 
in this special issue that formal program evaluation cannot help much, and we 
argue below that deliverology may be a different thing. We will therefore not at-
tempt any survey or appraisal of the current academic or professional literature 
on the theory and practice of evaluation—topics that are pursued more fully and 
effectively through other pages of this journal, as well as in reviews such as Dobell 
(2003) or in standard texts such as Eliadis et al. (2011) or McDavid, Huse, and 
Hawthorn (2012). Rather, we return to the message of an earlier paper (Dobell and 
Zussman, 1981) to emphasize that the key concerns lie elsewhere, in the role that 
must be played by disclosure of the narratives and evidence underlying decision-
making (including performance monitoring and program evaluation results) in 
buttressing the legitimacy of government. For this reason, we emphasize the need 
for the present government to complete the crucial review and reform of access 
to information policy that was promised in the 2015 election campaign to offset 
the erosion of that policy that has occurred since it was developed in the earlier 
Trudeau government in the 1970s and 1980s.4
Background
To make sense of all the recent activity and appraise its significance, we begin 
with some distinctions, separating several different topics. The first includes 
evaluation and challenge functions that deploy explicit—some might say elite or 
technocratic—analysis in support of executive decisions, either to initiate or to ter-
minate programs or activities. These functions generally emphasize what is called 
summative evaluation, addressing go/no-go decisions for individual, large-scale 
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programs. Analytical support for these decisions might include ongoing program 
evaluation (with evolving criteria, as exemplified in the 2009 Treasury Board Sec-
retariat assessment and reorientation [Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat, 2009] 
of evaluation activities that emphasized the seemingly more politically charged 
concern for “relevance” as a central criterion in [then] future evaluation efforts). 
Or they might offer a challenge function, where the considerations relate to the 
choice of organizational or institutional form for delivery of program outcomes, 
the test here being whether the activity under review should, given its ideological 
orientation, be undertaken by the government at all.
Within this framework, at cabinet level, one might expect to look to sum-
mative evaluation in strategic planning or in the ex-ante appraisal of proposed 
new programs, or to centre-led ex-post testing of the continued effectiveness, 
relevance, and value of existing ongoing programs, possibly in the context of mas-
sive program reviews and spending cuts.
Second, tracking—either internally or in public—of progress toward gov-
ernment fulfillment of election commitments and implementation of decisions 
by cabinet or departmental management should be seen as different, and is one 
aspect of deliverology. Of course, a range of institutional frames and incentive 
structures has long existed inside the federal government to promote tracking 
and delivery in programs approved for continuation, well before the deliverology 
label emerged (Curran, 2016).
A third category, aspiring to a regime of continuous improvement at a more 
operational level, spans monitoring and tracking of performance inside govern-
ment in the delivery of programs. At this more operational level, within de-
partments, there has long been an array of mechanisms for tracking ongoing 
management of programs within the public service. This grouping includes per-
formance measurement and monitoring systems such as the canonical Opera-
tional Performance Measurement System promoted by the Efficiency Evaluation 
Division of the Treasury Board Secretariat Planning Branch in the early 1970s and 
used in the government of Canada in some form ever since.
To guide the evolution of continuing government programs, management 
can rely on a schedule of ongoing formative evaluation over its full range of ac-
tivities. This continuous operational monitoring and appraisal function is distinct 
from the more fundamental periodic evaluations mentioned above (Maxwell, 
1986; McDavid et al., 2012), and indeed could be seen as a second dimension of 
deliverology, tracking ongoing follow-through of cabinet decisions into continu-
ing departmental operations as a new responsibility at cabinet committee level, 
with the support of the Privy Council Office, Results and Delivery unit).
As a fourth topic, a related development that also falls under the label of deliv-
erology should be highlighted as a distinct feature of the new thinking in Ottawa. 
That is the emphasis on behavioural psychology and behavioural economics in 
the work of so-called nudge units and innovation hubs (Chen, Bendle, & Soman, 
2017). These might be seen as contributing to formative program design and (per-
haps quite subtle) adaptive management decisions. But at the scale of the federal 
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government there are challenging institutional barriers to the style of adaptive 
management implied by emphasis on this work (Longo, in press).
Fundamental to all of this, we argue, is a distinct category of activities related 
to accountability mechanisms going beyond the direct interests of the executive in 
tracking its own performance. It involves the never-ending concern with informa-
tion for Parliament and its officers, general reporting to the public on government 
spending, and other information for public consumption,5 as well as, now, in the 
other direction, the growing fascination with open data, open government, and 
monitorial citizenship (Graeff, 2017) as mechanisms for holding governments to 
account and establishing the legitimacy that flows from transparency and access.
And, finally, as will be mentioned briefly in our concluding comments, we 
have to look now not just to access by citizens to information, but to participation 
of citizens in decision processes, reflecting ideas of open democracy and collective 
intelligence enabled by the transformation of information and communications 
technologies (Landemore, 2013, 2016; Sevinc, 2017).
Despite this impressive array of machinery, of course, sceptics argue that it 
is crucial to ask where is the demand for such work and where might the infor-
mation generated by all this activity actually be put to use? If neither public nor 
Parliament express any appetite for evidence-based decision in this post-fact 
world, why should we expect any of the apparatus described above to enter the 
real life of the public servant, let alone alter political decisions in ongoing opera-
tions or spending reviews? The recent exhaustive review by Rick French (French, 
2018a,b) of actual experience in this regard should be required reading for anyone 
interested in this question.
HIstorIcal context
In this section, we briefly review the high points in the evolution of practice—or 
at least intention—over the past 50 years, first with respect to ongoing evaluation 
practice and then looking to the particular case of intermittent comprehensive 
spending reviews, then deliverology, and, finally, developments toward greater 
transparency, with accounting officers, new oversight agencies, and the emerging 
emphasis on reporting and accountability as a distinct concern.
Program Evaluation
In the 1960s and 1970s, in the aftermath of World War II, enthusiasm for opera-
tions research and systems analysis, with the RAND Corporation appearing to 
solve intractable problems in economics and public sector management, Western 
governments enthusiastically embraced Planning, Programming and Budget-
ing Systems (PPBS), with its supporting analytical machinery, including cost-
effectiveness or cost–benefit analysis, to pursue optimal policies, or at least to 
increase the effectiveness of resource allocation decisions.
In 1966, the Treasury Board Secretariat became a stand-alone department of 
the government of Canada, responsible for expenditure management, for moving 
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cabinet decisions into government operations, and for implementing the recom-
mendations of the Royal Commission on Government Organization (the Glassco 
Commission), established in 1960 and reporting in 1963. The central message of 
that commission was to “let the managers manage” (in a rational manner), argu-
ing that departments should be free from excessive central control and should be 
encouraged to devise management methods suited to their needs.
The government’s response, as set out in the Treasury Board guide to financial 
management (Canada, Treasury Board, 1968), together with the two prior policy 
statements on performance measurement, in 1965, and financial management, in 
1966, might be taken as the starting point for our brief survey here.
Reflecting the objective of professionalizing the public service by implement-
ing modern management techniques, the Planning Branch of the Treasury Board 
Secretariat was formed in 1969 to build the analytical support for government 
decisions founded on “reason before passion.” That branch was organized in three 
main divisions: efficiency evaluation (performance measurement and monitor-
ing), effectiveness evaluation (program evaluation, including appraisal of ongoing 
programs and assessment of proposed initiatives), and organization (looking to 
appraisal of proposed structural or institutional innovations, as well as appoint-
ment of senior personnel).6
Management systems and policies on evaluation have since been through 
many stages in the government of Canada; the story is far too long to recount 
here. (See Segsworth [2005] for an account of events to 2005, Shepherd (2012), 
and Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat (2013–2014) for an exhaustive overall 
summary; Shepherd (2018) also covers policy changes over time.) With respect 
to prescribed evaluation practice, a benefit-cost manual was issued by Treasury 
Board in 1977, and in the same year a first set of policies and directives on evalu-
ation (based on the framework described in Hartle [1973]) was formally set out. 
Over the subsequent 3 decades these went through a series of revisions and ad-
justments, then on to a serious reappraisal in 2009, reflected in the new Policy on 
Results introduced, with substantial fanfare and extensive training efforts, by the 
new government in July 2016.
Program evaluation has thus been treated, under the guidance (or supervi-
sion, depending on the point of view) of the Treasury Board Secretariat, as a 
mandatory part of ongoing activity in Ottawa since 1966. This action ushered in 
a new industry for consultants and academics, who flocked to Ottawa to be part 
of this exciting new activity that was designed to make government more rational, 
effective, and efficient.
Over the past 2 years, the current federal government has taken several steps 
intended to strengthen the program evaluation function. It has released a new 
Policy on Results (with a new but not novel directive on program evaluation) 
requiring departments to evaluate their programs on a 5-year cycle (see Canada, 
Treasury Board Secretariat, 2016a, 2016d); it has appointed chief evaluation 
officers in all federal departments, who report directly to the deputy minister 
and who have full responsibility for ensuring that comprehensive evaluation 
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plans are prepared and carried out7; and it has apparently embraced thoroughly 
the philosophy of deliverology as preached by Sir Michael Barber to Tony Blair 
(Zilio, 2016).
The seriousness of the government’s intentions was underlined with the 
 release of the prime minister’s mandate letters to the president of the Treasury 
Board and the minister for democratic institutions. These letters explicitly ass-
igned them responsibility to “work with the Minister of Finance and your col-
leagues to conduct a review of tax expenditures and other spending to reduce 
poorly targeted and inefficient measures, wasteful spending, and government 
initiatives that are ineffective or have outlived their purpose,”8 and “take a leader-
ship role to review policies to improve the use of evidence and data in program 
innovation and evaluation, more open data, and a more modern approach to 
comptrollership” (Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, 2015).
Beyond the federal government, it is important to note current work  toward 
a broader conceptual and procedural framework that, while it may not be well- 
suited to deliberation at cabinet level, offers real promise at a sectoral or region-
al scale. Hodge (2017) illustrates the potential for path-breaking participatory 
contribution analysis using applications in the mining and minerals sector as 
examples; Budhwani and McDavid (2017) provide a contemporary survey of 
contribution analysis more generally.
Spending Reviews
Through the early 1970s, things were generally buoyant in Canada and abroad. 
The A/B/X approach to budgeting embedded in PPBS focused on B: discretionary 
new programs were embraced enthusiastically. The A-base of continuing pro-
grams expanded with inflation, demography, and increasing participation rates 
(see Canada, Treasury Board, 1978). And the X-budget, identifying expenditure 
reductions, received little attention, despite in some cases enthusiastically negative 
ratings flowing from summative evaluation efforts.
This all changed in the late 1970s, most visibly in 1978 when the prime min-
ister returned from the G7 summit meeting in Bonn to inform his minister of 
finance and Treasury Board president that he had undertaken a commitment to a 
substantial budget cut. The system had to scramble to deliver.
With the election of Brian Mulroney in 1984, the Ministerial Task Force on 
Program Review led by Deputy Prime Minister Erik Nielsen followed, with the 
professional support of the public service and the input of external consultants 
who were engaged to take a whole-of-government look at annual spending. As 
a result, after 18 months of work, over 100 private sector participants and as 
many public servants reviewed more than 1,000 programs. While the analysis 
yielded many potential areas of government savings through the termination 
of existing ineffective programs and merging of overlapping activities, Prime 
Minister  Mulroney did not have the heart to make the tough spending cuts and 
little financial saving was achieved despite the concerted efforts of many experts 
(Bourgon, 2009).
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It wasn’t until 1994, with the return of the Liberals under Prime Minister 
Chrétien, that another serious assessment of government spending was undertak-
en. This time, a sluggish Canadian economy and skyrocketing national debt forced 
the prime minister to take bold action. The resulting exercise, known as program 
review, was championed by a cabinet committee, chaired by Marcel Massé, presi-
dent of the Treasury Board, but effectively driven by the public service, particu-
larly by the Department of Finance, who established hard savings targets for each 
department and agency. As well, the committee established a requirement that 
every federal program be subject to an assessment based on six simple questions 
about their overall contribution to the public good (see Appendix 1).
Shortly after coming to power in 2006, the Harper government announced 
several strategic spending reviews. The purpose was to demonstrate that embed-
ded in federal programs was a lot of wasteful or inefficient spending that could be 
diverted from underperforming programs to those that reflected the Conserva-
tive government’s own priorities. All government departments and agencies were 
subjected to an ongoing cost-cutting exercise with the intention of achieving a 
5% reduction in government spending. Five years later, the Harper government 
reported that 98% of direct program spending had been reviewed and that the 5% 
savings target had been achieved (Savoie, 2013, p. 102).
In 2011 the Harper government launched a second review designed to be 
more strategic and targeted toward identifying $5 billion in annual savings by 
2014. This time, as compared to the Neilsen task force, which brought in seconded 
(volunteer) private sector personnel to work with the public servant teams, the 
government contracted the whole cost reduction exercise to a consulting com-
pany. The idea was to remove public servants, perceived to be self-interested, 
from the review and to encourage government-wide recommendations from 
outside advisors thought to bring a more independent and comprehensive view. 
At the political level, the DRAP exercise was led by a special Treasury Board 
cabinet committee that also included a large number of experts from outside of 
government who participated in the decision making. When confronted about the 
appointment of people from outside the government to lead an internal cabinet 
task force, Finance Minister Jim Flaherty justified the $20 million contract with 
Deloitte Touche by saying that “it isn’t good, quite frankly, for government to look 
just at itself ” (Curry, 2011).
Deliverology (Delivery and Results)
Moving in a different direction, a central innovation hub was promised in the 
2013 federal public service review initiative that led to the Blueprint 2020  report 
(Canada, Privy Council Office, 2016). In 2014, one such central innovation hub 
was opened in the Privy Council Office, with hubs also in Employment,  Social 
Dev elopment and the Canada Revenue Agency to pursue the model of the UK 
nudge units focused on experimentation and the co-design or collaborative 
tweaking of program designs (Chen et al., 2017). This focus on experimentation 
introduces a new enthusiasm to be pressed on the public service: in place of the 
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marketing, early in the Trudeau I era, of all the esoteric machinery of cost–benefit 
analysis in all its variants—including the risk–benefit analyses on which it usually 
founders—we have now, during Trudeau II, all the esoteric machinery of the “gold 
standard” of randomized controlled trials (or the ingenious mutations envisaged 
when the strict conditions for RCT are missing) as the subject of the uphill mis-
sionary work radiating out from the centre (Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat, 
2016b), this time from the Privy Council Office rather than the Treasury Board 
Secretariat.
A rationale for the “Libertarian Paternalism” underlying this work was set 
out by Thaler and Sunstein (2008), and found its way also into the Obama White 
House (United States, National Science and Technology Council, 2017), though 
not, perhaps, to the same extent as in 10 Downing Street. The basic idea is that 
one can affect behaviour by shaping choice rather than regulating action. As a 
result, coercive regulations and the threat of enforcement action for violation of 
them are replaced by a reframing of the terms of the choice to be made, nudging 
and leaning to recast the way one sees one’s own preferences and thus to shape 
consequent voluntary action. The spreading impact of this idea is reflected in 
the award of the 2017 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences to Richard Thaler (and, 
before that, to Daniel Kahneman in 2002).
As noted above, it is important to distinguish this work on experimentation, 
nudging, and adaptive management from the tracking of results and delivery that 
is the other face of deliverology, and more closely related to the next topic.
Reporting and Accountability
There has been overarching change in public pressure and expectations for ac-
countability and transparency in government. The first years of the Trudeau 
I government saw the end of the substantially untroubled post–World War II 
reconstruction and expansion in Western economies and the beginning of the 
period that led the OECD to launch the McCracken committee, its international 
enquiry into “What went wrong?” in the global economy. In Canada, concerns 
about rising deficits led to anxiety in the business community.
This concern coincided with growing disputes between the government and 
the auditor general—first Maxwell Henderson, then James J. MacDonnell—over the 
right of the auditor general to comment on the wisdom of government decisions. 
A committee, the Independent Review Committee on the Office of the Auditor 
General (the Wilson committee), was formed. It recommended a new Auditor 
General Act to extend substantially the scope and powers of the auditor general, 
in particular, creating a mandate to go beyond traditional audits, attesting that the 
books of the government fairly represented its financial position and that monies 
had been expended for the purposes for which they had been appropriated by 
Parliament.
The notion of “management audit” was introduced, inviting the auditor gen-
eral to report on whether “value for money” had been received as a result of the 
decisions of the government. Under the new act, James MacDonnell took those 
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new powers seriously. Beyond his famous remark—“I am deeply concerned that 
Parliament—and indeed the government—has lost, or is close to losing, effective 
control of the public purse”—MacDonnell pressed heavily to move the auditor gen-
eral role deeply into what had always been considered appraisal addressed to politi-
cal, not accounting or technical, questions. The accountability of the government 
on economic and social, as well as financial, issues became a controversial topic.
Accountability on other fronts also became topical with the Royal Commis-
sion on Financial Management and Accountability (the Lambert Commission), 
which issued its final report in 1979. The memorable tag line from that report was 
“make the managers manage,” suggesting that decentralization and delegation in 
the federal government, as recommended by the Glassco Commission, had gone 
too far, and greater oversight was essential.
The 1982 report of the Special Parliamentary Task Force on Fiscal Federal-
ism similarly highlighted the concept of accountability as crucial in deciding on 
the appropriate division of responsibilities between national and subnational 
governments.9
This pressure led in 2006 to the creation by the incoming Harper government, 
as part of the Federal Accountability Act, of the Parliamentary Budget Office, the 
public sector integrity commissioner, commissioner of lobbying, and the conflict 
of interest and ethics commissioner, as well as the formation of departmental 
audit committees (Zussman, 2017). At the same time, there was an increase in 
the oversight capacity of several parliamentary agents and a growing network of 
independent think tanks and other types of organizations dedicated to tracking 
government activities, providing parliamentary oversight (watchdog roles) and 
policy commentary.
Over the past decade, the pressure to move from inside scrutiny to outside 
has continued even more strongly. A flow from confidence in program evalua-
tion to reliance on disclosure of information can be traced strikingly in the work 
of Doug Hartle from the first days of the Planning Branch to his later advocacy 
back at the University of Toronto (Dobell, 1999), and in subsequent literature 
leading recently to notions of monitorial citizenship (Graeff, 2017) and expan-
sion of independent web-based “tracking” services (e.g., Promise Tracker [n.d.] 
or TrudeauMeter [n.d.]).
dIscussIon
Over the past 40 years or so there has been a steady stream of research and com-
mentary on the state of evaluation at the federal level. In 1981, Dobell and Zuss-
man reviewed the progress and contribution of efforts at evaluation activities 
over the prior decade (Dobell and Zussman, 1981), noting that there seemed little 
evidence of success as measured against promises and expectations. By 1986, the 
Nielsen task force concluded that “government program evaluations were gener-
ally useless and inadequate despite the emergence of evaluation units in most 
government departments” (Canada, Task Force on Program Review, 1986, p 23).
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The piling on continued in the academic literature when Peter Aucoin ob-
served that program evaluation “has never been embedded in the expenditure 
management decision-making process” (Aucoin, 2005, pp. 5, 10), or with Bour-
geois and Whynot (this issue), who concluded that “our findings are generally 
consistent with those of previous studies and reveal that, although instrumental 
and conceptual use tends to be quite high at program level, there is little or no 
strategic use of evaluation beyond program improvement, and that evaluation is 
not used to inform spending reviews” (2018, p. 342). Perhaps the debate can be 
closed off with a summary judgement offered by Barry Carin, both a major sup-
plier and demandeur of evaluation work and a founder of the Canadian Evaluation 
Society, which publishes this journal:
On balance, I conclude that it is an illusion to think that you can be analytic and 
positive—there are too many incommensurable objectives with incomplete metrics, 
too many permutations and combinations of pertinent sensitivity calculations beyond 
what anyone can absorb, let alone have the patience to read. I therefore do not believe 
that you can either perform evaluations useful for Ministers, or evaluate the evalua-
tion function (as I just did). (B. Carin, personal communication, June 2017)
Thus, with respect to the direct influence of program evaluation efforts 
on routine decisions, the lesson is generally accepted, as John Mayne (2018) 
perhaps confirms. It now seems necessary to fall back on the larger vision, the 
article of faith driving commitment to evaluation in government from the 1960s 
onward. This faith is that ongoing systematic evidence-based analysis builds a 
foundation of knowledge and enlightenment (Weiss, 1972, 1999) from which 
spring the relevant stories, beliefs, and perceptions on which intuitive decisions 
will be based.10
What about spending reviews themselves? Is there a case for any useful link 
from program evaluation to central spending reviews in situations of critical 
budgetary pressure? It seems not. The evaluation work of the Planning Branch 
played no role in the 1978 X-budget. Indeed the branch was just in the process 
of being dissolved. “The 1986 Nielsen Task Force was effective in reducing ex-
penditures where rational evaluation aligned with the quiet suspicions of senior 
managements” (H. Swain, personal communication, June 2017). This observation 
nicely reconciles the comment quoted above, that task force study teams found 
evaluations “useless,” with the protest by John Mayne (Mayne, 1986) that evalua-
tions had been extensively used.
While the 1995 program review budget specifically targeted underperform-
ing programs, there is no evidence that Prime Minister Chrétien, Finance Minister 
Paul Martin, or Treasury Board President Marcel Massé used program evaluation 
reports in identifying programs for cancellation or spending reductions. But is all 
this surprising? In routine circumstances, something like the old A/B/X approach 
to budgeting can prevail: the ongoing operational A-base moves along incremen-
tally, the B-budget to fund new programs is allocated, and the X-budget identifies 
programs that can be eliminated to make room for the new.
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In times of crisis, however, it is essential to go beyond the decremental or 
marginal X-budget, and dig deep into the A-base to regain control of total ex-
penditures while funding the new activity essential to a growing, changing, and 
innovative society. In the compressed time frame of such a spending review, there 
can be no realistic expectation of directly relevant evaluation results on tap or 
built to order that can bring information to bear on judgments about the relative 
importance or relative priority across broad categories of program expenditures. 
The best that one might hope is that triangulation across the perceptions, beliefs, 
and views—with luck, perhaps influenced by a foundation of accumulated past 
individual evaluation efforts—of diverse groups of responsible ministers can 
provide a basis for consensus on action-oriented decisions.
There is, of course, an even broader tension underlying all these efforts to 
convey information on which to ground action. The biggest challenge, as always, is 
flawed implementation of decisions and intentions—particularly where those in-
tentions are vast and “aspirational.” Implementation of policy intentions demands 
performance by individual public servants exercising discretion within a body of 
public service norms. It demands fidelity to the text expressing those intentions, 
but it also demands interpretation of that text and exercise of discretion in carry-
ing out the performance.
The problem—an ancient problem—is whether to exercise that discretion in 
accord with the black letter text or according to the dictates of particular chang-
ing and uncertain circumstances, on the ground. This is where the fundamental 
challenges of accountability arise, but also where the constraints of excessive audit 
bind badly. The search for the “sweet spot” between “letting the managers man-
age” according to their instincts, within general understandings of the rules, and 
“making the managers manage” within clear and precise uniform rules established 
in light of consistent intentions across the enterprise seems never satisfactorily 
ended.11 A wonderful example is provided by the controversy around the public 
service attempt in 2017 to codify the operational implications of a 2011 tax court 
ruling on the status of employee discounts as a taxable benefit for income tax 
purposes (Tasker, 2017).
Can a new analytical unit add anything significant to the delivery-oriented 
monitoring structure already inherent in the institutional structure of the govern-
ment of Canada? Are there better ways to decentralize responsibility and move 
monitoring from the centre? It can be argued that deliverology, as experimenta-
tion, innovation, and adaptive management, while promising in principle, is not 
well adapted to the role of the federal government, which has control of very little 
direct delivery of services (Curran, 2016)—and where it does, as in the Phoenix 
payroll system, it does not have an impressive record.
The really significant shift does not rest in the new Policy on Results, still 
based on the idea of the rational economic man, but rather in a deeper intellectual 
transition recognizing the imperfections in human reasoning, reflected in the rise 
of behavioural insight units, and behavioural economics more broadly. We return 
briefly to this question below.
Sunshine, Scrutiny, and Spending Review in Canada 383
CJPE 32.3, 371–393 © 2018doi: 10.3138/cjpe.43184
In the first decade of the Pierre Trudeau administration, the focus—at least 
for the analysts and “hot-shot advisors”—was on the policy formation phases 
of the policy process. Once cabinet had made—or not—a decision, that was 
the end of the story for analytical purposes (though not, of course, for the vast 
majority of public servants, whose task was simply to keep the turbines of the 
power company turning while those decisions were implemented). The work to be 
done in implementation—realizing the intent of decisions endorsed—was taken 
for granted as routine management (even though in the middle of that decade 
Pressman and Wildavsky [1973] published what was to become a famous book 
on implementation with a most suggestive subtitle, How Great Expectations in 
Washington Are Dashed in Oakland).
Now in the first term of the Justin Trudeau government, the focus seems to 
have shifted significantly to the implementation and delivery phase of the cycle. 
This shift matters beyond the peculiar interests of the academic observer; for the 
evaluation industry and evaluation practice, it moves the emphasis away from 
summative evaluation and decisions, and toward policy design, formative evalu-
ation, and adaptive management (Gold, 2014). For the public service it forces 
attention to the changes in policy that actually occur at the workface, at the level 
of individual programs, and, indeed, at the level of design of forms in individual 
sub-activities.12 And this is where behavioural insights come into play.
conclusIon
We have argued that the current structure for evidence-based management by 
results in the federal government is, despite some changes in labels and story lines, 
not very different in purpose or substance from what has been familiar for a long 
time. With respect to evaluation policy and evaluation activities generally, we do 
not dispute the general opinion expressed elsewhere in this volume that there is 
no reason to expect any direct link from program evaluation to cabinet decisions. 
While evaluation efforts addressing ongoing programs—formative evaluation—
can offer obvious contributions to continuous improvement in departmental 
expenditure management, and nudge units can suggest fruitful reframing of 
designs, they are highly unlikely to offer empirical or analytical evidence that 
ministers will see as definitive or even terribly relevant to specific cabinet deci-
sions. What can be hoped, as emphasized by one of the founders of the program 
evaluation movement in the United States, Carol Weiss, is that a culture of ongo-
ing analysis and evaluation will build a foundation of general understanding and 
“enlightenment” that informs ministerial perspectives and cabinet deliberations 
(Weiss, 1972, 1998).
We have argued more specifically, on the basis of extensive personal experi-
ence, that in the case of either occasional or systematic spending reviews, neither 
the timetable nor the political context lends itself to considered comprehensive re-
duction of the expenditure budget as a package. Decisions about cuts will likely be 
made arbitrarily, based on perceptions and beliefs—probably those of one strong 
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individual enjoying the confidence and backing of the prime minister—about 
program merits but, more importantly, about the appropriateness of the activity as 
a responsibility of the federal government of the day. Again, perhaps the most one 
can hope (counterfactually?) is that an ongoing culture of respect for evidence and 
interest in outcomes will have shaped the opinions and perspectives of that central 
individual in a way that promotes a broad public interest rather than ideologically-
driven motivated reasoning pressing toward ever-smaller government.
This leaves us with hopes, first, for effective tracking of commitments and 
monitoring of progress internally within departments and government as a 
whole, and visible public accountability for continuing and faithful implementa-
tion of decisions and realization of commitments. Much of this machinery has 
long been in place in the federal government, but perhaps it is here that deliverol-
ogy (under whatever label) and the cabinet committee on agenda and results will 
concentrate the minds of politicians and managers and thus offer fresh impetus 
to the concern for effectiveness in the delivery of just outcomes.13 Beyond that, 
there is the hope that effective measures for reporting to Parliament will generate 
feedback that will forcefully shape ministerial and managerial perceptions as to 
the public interest. Those attitudes might thus be shaped indirectly through pro-
gram evaluation and the culture of attention to the evidence underlying stories 
and narratives.
None of this can really work, however, without a dramatic transformation 
in current government attitudes toward public access to information in govern-
ment hands and to the use being made of that information in shaping government 
decisions. Despite all the protestations of openness and transparency, practice in 
this matter is disappointing. The recent experience of the auditor general in being 
denied access to analysis of tax expenditures associated with the government’s 
commitment to phase out “inefficient” subsidies to fossil fuel industries, and in-
deed failure to receive documentation on action taken toward implementation of 
that commitment, is only one extreme example.14 As we argued in 1981, we need 
sunshine and scrutiny, and we need access for the public to see the evidence and 
the analysis on which government decisions are built and on which the legitimacy 
of government must be maintained.
But of course, this is not 1981. Government attitudes toward openness now 
must reflect the massive transformations since then in technology, information 
and communications systems, social networking, learning algorithms, and arti-
ficial intelligence (see Longo, in press). Can this Liberal government succeed in 
translating the basic principles of the access to information policy introduced by 
the Liberal government of the 1980s into an appropriate information regime for 
this new context? If so, government’s role in evaluating government (for decision 
purposes) may prove much less significant than the public’s role in evaluating 
government (for accountability and legitimacy) on the basis of fuller disclosure. 
“It is possible . . . that institutional arrangements to strengthen representative 
institutions could be developed in the context of a participatory e-democracy. In 
such a setting, a deliberative democratic approach to evaluation could be pursued 
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in inclusive processes at various scales, as part of ongoing conversations, ongoing 
social learning, ongoing adaptive management, in ongoing resilient communities” 
(Dobell, 2003).
Because it is 2017, we need now to frame the case for access much more 
expansively. In an era of Big Data and open government, we must argue pas-
sionately for open public access not just to the data assembled and held by 
governments but also to the interpretations of those data buried in the sto-
ries and narratives built upon them for purposes of providing background 
to government decisions. This access need not reach to the options identified 
or recommendations offered by public servants in memoranda to cabinet, or 
to opinions voiced in cabinet deliberations, all of which rightly must remain 
cabinet confidences. But it should include the analysis and interpretations built 
by public servants from data in public hands. And, indeed, beyond access to 
these materials, arguments for opportunity to participate in the processes of 
framing the questions themselves and of articulating the context for creating 
these stories and narratives must be vigourously pursued (see Chouinard, 2013; 
Chouinard & Milley, 2015)
More demandingly still, not only must the case for access to the data and 
information in government hands, and to interpretations of them—the evidence, 
representations, and visualizations on which decisions are built—and to the pro-
cess of framing those questions and creating those interpretations, be maintained, 
but also, finally, the case must be made for inclusive citizen participation in the 
process of building legitimate collective decisions themselves from those inter-
pretations and stories.15
And, to close, yet more speculatively, we as academics or practitioners should 
perhaps ask ourselves how long we should expect to go on as we are in our pro-
motion and practice of current theories or techniques of evaluation. It is a new 
world out there; maybe it should also become a new world in here, in the academy 
and the profession. How long might it be before the whole process of extracting 
relevant evidence from vast banks of observations and data will be handled better 
by smart robots than by humans? Given the extent to which audit, accounting, 
analysis, evaluation, and performance measurement are generally taught through 
established recipes and simple inference or learning processes, surely it is likely 
that recursively self-improving automata will quickly learn the required skills? 
That this outcome may arrive sooner than we think is suggested by evidence 
already with us.16
Obviously, these further ideas take us into a whole new world, well beyond 
the scope of the present note. But perhaps in closing we can once again urge the 
evaluation community away from continuing to differentiate the labels and fine-
tune the footnotes or nuances in a literature on the main conclusions of which—as 
summarized above—academicians and practitioners generally agree. Rather, per-
haps we might turn to exploring, tentatively but vigorously, the vast new worlds 
that open to us to transform our representative democracy by engaging the people 
in its decisions.
386  Dobell and Zussman
© 2018 CJPE 32.3, 371–393 doi: 10.3138/cjpe.43184
notes
 1  The authors have between them many years of academic research and hands-on experi-
ence in or around this field, particularly at the federal level.
 2  The excessive personalization of the Government of Canada embedded in this short-
hand is regrettable, but seems necessary to avoid cumbersome circumlocution.
 3  Distinct components of the machinery that goes under the label ‘Deliverology’ are 
discussed below.
 4  After this article was largely completed, we received the annual report of the informa-
tion commissioner for 2016–2017. It seems essential to highlight the message with 
which she leads off that report:
In March 2017, the government announced its plans to delay the first phase of the 
Act’s reform, citing the need to “get it right.” Our investigations reveal, once again, that 
the Act is being used as a shield against transparency and is failing to meet its policy 
objective to foster accountability and trust in our government. Budget 2017 contained 
no funding for transparency measures and, sadly, there is no direction from the head 
of the public service regarding transparency, likely meaning there will be minimal 
impact on the culture of secrecy within the public service. To top it off, institutional 
performance in relation to compliance with the Act is showing signs of decline, while 
Canadians’ demand for information increases. Comprehensive reform of the Act is es-
sential and long overdue, especially in the face of the expanding information realities 
of the 21st century. A lot of work needs to be done before this government can meet 
its transparency promises. (Canada, Office of the Information Commissioner, 2017)
 5  For evidence on legislative interest in performance reports, and the link between per-
formance reporting and performance itself at local level, see McDavid (2017).
 6  It is important to note that the new Results and Delivery Secretariat also includes 
two quite distinct components, the results and delivery group headed by an assistant 
secretary to cabinet, oriented toward appraisal and tracking, and an innovation hub 
headed by an assistant deputy minister, oriented toward experimentation and adap-
tive management. (This latter might be seen as distinct from the results group in the 
same way that the organization division of the Planning Branch was distinct from its 
evaluation divisions.)
 7  See the Treasury Board Directive on Results (Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat, 
2016a) for a detailed description of the policy.
 8  Two features might be thought striking: the first—central to our message here—is 
the inclusion of the Minister of Democratic Institutions in expenditure management 
concerns; the second is the prominent reference to the longstanding question of tax 
expenditures, a challenge that figures centrally in the issue of access by Parliamentary 
agents, including the Auditor-General, to government information, as noted later in 
this chapter.
 9  Three reports (Schmitz, 1994; Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat, 2005; Aucoin, 2006) 
tell the story in interestingly different ways.
10  This vision suggests an analogy with the dual process brain described by Kahneman 
(2011). In the dual process democracy, System I accumulates the observations and 
builds the heuristics, intuitions and perceptions on which ongoing decisions about ac-
tion will be based, but System II tries to discipline these decisions, subjecting them to 
rational analysis based on a more orderly process of building tested knowledge from 
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accumulated evidence. (It is tempting, but obviously far-fetched, to think of the role of 
the Senate in this context as the chamber of ‘sober second thought’.)
11  This is also where—as a glance at the comment streams on tracking sites will attest—
disputes arise about whether delivery of what was promised has actually happened, 
whether commitments have truly been fulfilled.
12  As Barry Carin (2015) noted in a 2011 symposium, “We feel like we make decisions, 
but many of our decisions are made by default, by people who design forms. An excel-
lent example is the choice of default option for the organ donation decision on driver 
license forms.” Carin’s insightful but sadly overlooked paper appears in the symposium 
proceedings edited by Parson (2015). His introduction of this “new paternalism” now 
reflected in Nudge units stimulated at the time much discussion of the extent to which 
the values and choices embraced by public servants seep into public policy indepen-
dently of elected representative governments.
13  It has been argued that a mid-term attempt by the present government to report on 
promises delivered is not persuasive (Rathgeber, 2017).
14  See the spring 2017 message of the auditor general to Parliament (Canada, Office of the 
Auditor General, 2017). The May 12, 2017, order-in-council responding to that mes-
sage does not resolve the deeper ongoing problem; only a full-scale renewal of access 
to information policy will do that, and such reform should be, as promised, the subject 
of a much more sincere and forceful effort than is currently evident. (Unfortunately, 
the April 2016 directive on the subject [Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat, 2016c] 
does not do the job, because subsection 2.4 leaves wide open the definition of “Cabinet 
confidences” that lies at the heart of the issue.)
15  On these more ambitious ideas, going beyond open government to open source gov-
ernance, collective intelligence, and “upstreaming citizen participation,” see Lenihan 
(2012), Landemore (2013) and online portals (Open Governance Research Exchange, 
n.d.) (Hudson, (2016).
16  See Bostrom (2014) and Grace, Salvatier, Dafoe, Zhang, and Evans (2017) for examples. 
Perhaps a starting point for such machine learning might be found in the Evaluation 
Checklists at Evaluation Center (2018).
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Appendix 1: Six Questions for Program Review 
(http://www.gouvernance.ca/publications/96-15.pdf)
1) Public Interest Test: Does the program area or activity continue to serve 
a public interest? 
2) Role of Government Test: Is there a legitimate and necessary role for 
government in this program area or activity? 
3) Federalism Test: Is the current role of the federal government appropri-
ate, or is the program a candidate for realignment with the provinces? 
4) Partnership Test: What activities or programs should or could be trans-
ferred in whole or in part to the private or voluntary sector? 
5) Efficiency Test: If the program or activity continues, how could its 
efficiency be improved? 
6) Affordability Test: Is the resultant package of programs and activities 
affordable within the fiscal restraint? If not, what programs or activities 
should be abandoned?
